Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Risk-Sensitive Cost

dc.contributor.authorBISWAS, ANUPen_US
dc.contributor.authorSaha, Subhamayen_US
dc.contributor.departmentDept. of Mathematicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-26T06:33:36Z
dc.date.available2020-02-26T06:33:36Z
dc.date.issued2020-02en_US
dc.description.abstractZero-sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with underlying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics, we completely characterize all possible saddle point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also establish existence-uniqueness result for the value function of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation.en_US
dc.identifier.citationApplied Mathematics and Optimization, 81(1), 113-140.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0095-4616en_US
dc.identifier.issn1432-0606en_US
dc.identifier.sourcetitleApplied Mathematics and Optimizationen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dr.iiserpune.ac.in:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/4445
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00245-018-9479-8
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publication.originofpublisherForeignen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Natureen_US
dc.subjectStochastic differential gamesen_US
dc.subjectRisk-sensitive payoffen_US
dc.subjectHamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equationsen_US
dc.subjectSaddle point strategyen_US
dc.subjectVerification resulten_US
dc.subjectTOC-FEB-2020en_US
dc.subject2020en_US
dc.titleZero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Risk-Sensitive Costen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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