Fair Randomized Allocations under Lexicographic Valuations
Abstract
In this thesis, we study the problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among a group of agents. Envy-free (EF) allocations might fail to exist in this setting, motivating the study of relaxed notions such as EF1 and EFX. While EF1 allocations can always be computed e fficiently, the existence of EFX (even for n >= 4 additive agents) remains one of fair division’s largest unresolved problems to date. However, upon restricting our domain to lexicographic valuations - a subclass of additive functions - EFX allocations are known to always exist. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve EF in expectation (ex-ante). However, preserving ex-ante fairness while ensuring that every deterministic allocation in the support also satisfies strong fairness guarantees (ex-post) is a far more non-trivial problem. In this thesis, we detail our attempts to compute randomized allocations that are simultaneously ex-ante EF and ex-post EFX, for agents with lexicographic valuations. Our main result is a polynomial time algorithm which computes an ex-ante 6/7 -EF and ex-post EFX+PO allocation for lexicographic goods. For the chores setting, we provide an algorithm that gives ex-ante EF and ex-post EFX, but fails ex-post PO. Finally, we show that by relaxing ex-ante EF to ex-ante PROP, it is possible to obtain ex-post EFX + PO for both goods and chores. We also discuss some of our alternative approaches and study their guarantees and limitations.
Description
Keywords
Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, Fair Division, Randomized Algorithms, Econ-CS, Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items, Lexicographic Preferences, Envy Free item allocation, Algorithms, Theory CS, Multi Agent Systems, Pareto Optimality, Research Subject Categories::MATHEMATICS::Applied mathematics::Theoretical computer science
Citation
92